Thomas Green Inexperience - Determine the best strategy

Read this case and write about Thomas Green Inexperience using the step 2. Max 4 pages . This needs to be written from the perspective of Thomas (you are Thomas)

Step 2: Determine the best strategy/approach to address the issue.

Now that there is a core issue to focus on, what is the best way to begin addressing it in a way that will

improve the situation. Start with divergent thinking to uncover potential approaches, then use

convergent thinking to choose the most promising approach.

Questions that may be helpful during divergent thinking:

Who can I influence to address the issue?

What forces can I bring to bear on the issue?

What if I wait or do nothing?

If considering this evidence as a group, what efforts have been made to avoid groupthink and to

include diverse perspectives?

Questions that may be helpful during convergent thinking:

How well does each alternative address the criteria above (purpose, values, goals) in relation to

your issues?

How likely is each alternative to be successful?

What are the potential costs, limitations, implications, unintended consequences of each

alternative?

Which of these alternatives are within my control?

What ethical issues may be relevant here?

What evidence supports each alternative?

What additional information would be most valuable to acquire?

What could cause each approach to fail (i.e., play devil’s advocate)?

How would a reasonable person disagree?

Did I consider the short-run versus long-run implications: optimizing versus satisficing?

 

 

Thomas Green:

Power, Office Politics, and a Career in Crisis

Another long day at the office had drawn to a close. Thomas Green felt the pulsing in his temples that usually preceded a migraine. As he stepped outside Dynamic Displays’ corporate headquarters in Boston, the brisk air made him catch his breath. It was now February 5, 2008. Green could not believe that in five short months his dream promotion had turned into a disaster. When Green had been promoted to his new position in September, he was a rising star. Now, he would be lucky to celebrate his one-year anniversary with the company. His boss, Frank Davis, had sent the division vice president, Shannon McDonald, two scathing emails criticizing Green’s performance. Green and Davis had yet to see eye to eye on work styles or market trends. Tension had also risen when Green did not enthusiastically endorse the sales forecasts made by Davis. Green felt the forecasts were either overly optimistic or outright fabrications.

Before he left for the day, Green had reread the series of emails regarding his performance and was certain that Davis was setting him up to be dismissed. Davis’s most recent email had made it clear to Green that his position as a senior market specialist was in jeopardy. He did not have much time to rectify the situation. McDonald had emailed a formal request to him that afternoon, asking for his perspective on his performance and how he was going to improve the situation. With this in mind, Green started his commute home and began to analyze what went wrong and what he could do to save his job.

Company and Industry Background

Dynamic Displays was founded in 1990 as a provider of self-service options to banks via Automated Teller Machines (ATMs). In 1994, Dynamic Displays launched a new division aimed at the travel and hospitality industry, and deployed their first self-service check-in kiosk for Discover Airlines. In 2007, Dynamic Displays’ Travel and Hospitality Division had 60% market share with over 1,500 self-service kiosks in use at more than 75 airports. Customers included regional, national, and international airline carriers, as well as various hotels and car-rental agencies. Eighty percent of the Travel and Hospitality Division’s 2007 revenue came from airline carrier clients, 15% from hotels,

HBS Professor W. Earl Sasser and Heather Beckham prepared this case solely as a basis for class discussion and not as an endorsement, a source of primary data, or an illustration of effective or ineffective management.

This case, though based on real events, is fictionalized, and any resemblance to actual persons or entities is coincidental. There are occasional references to actual companies in the narration.

Copyright © 2008 President and Fellows of Harvard College. To order copies or request permission to reproduce materials, call 1-800-545-7685, write Harvard Business Publishing, Boston, MA 02163, or go to http://www.hbsp.harvard.edu. This publication may not be digitized, photocopied, or otherwise reproduced, posted, or transmitted, without the permission of Harvard Business School.

2095 | Thomas Green: Power, Office Politics, and a Career in Crisis

and 5% from car-rental agencies. The company was a full service provider, offering hardware, software, engineering, and maintenance support.

Kiosks were an attractive option for airlines to quickly and easily check in passengers while reducing processing costs. Dynamic Displays’ kiosks not only reduced costs but also improved customer service, shortened passenger wait times, and provided valuable information to these travelers. In 2006, Forrester Research estimated the average cost for an airline passenger to check in through an agent was $3.02, versus a range of $0.14 to $0.32 for kiosk check-in.1 This impressive savings was realized by allowing the repetitive tasks of selecting or changing seat assignments and printing and distributing boarding passes to be handled by the passengers themselves. Airlines reduced headcount or assigned the agents to more value-added tasks, such as solving complex customer service issues and ensuring compliance with safety and security standards. The cost savings were particularly important for the airline industry during a period when margins were razor thin and fuel costs were continuing to climb.

Airlines were also aggressively promoting another self-service option for travelers. Web check-in allowed passengers to complete the entire check-in process via the internet from a remote location, utilizing their personal or office computer. Cost savings using online check-in was of even greater benefit because the airline did not have to purchase and install a kiosk, and passengers printed their own boarding passes using their own paper. According to a 2006 Forrester report, airport kiosks were a mature application with 75% of U.S. leisure passengers using kiosk in 2006. Web check-in on the other hand, was still experiencing dramatic growth, increasing from less than 45% of U.S. leisure passengers in 2005 to 64% in 2006.2

 

Thomas Green: Path to Senior Market Specialist

Thomas Green was born in 1979 in Brunswick, Georgia, the son of a postman and a school secretary. At the University of Georgia, he worked in a warehouse and washed cars while earning a bachelor’s degree in Economics. His first full-time job was in sales for National Business Solutions in Atlanta. Green enjoyed impressive success in the Banking Division, focusing on ATM sales to regional banks in the Southeast. In March 2007, Dynamic Displays recruited Green for an account executive position in the Southeast territory for the Travel and Hospitality Division. To Green, Dynamic Displays seemed to present a great chance for a fast climb up the managerial ladder.

Green hit the ground running at Dynamic Displays. In his first four months as an account executive, he completed a contract for one of the largest airline carriers, Journey Airlines, to accelerate rollout of kiosks in 20 airports and purchase upgraded software for kiosks in the majority of their locations.

Green had told a close friend, “I wanted to come in and dazzle them at Dynamic Displays. This was no easy feat. But I wanted more than an account executive position. I had heard there was a lot of opportunity for fresh talent at corporate headquarters and I made it my mission to get noticed immediately.”

Senior executives at Dynamic Displays quickly took notice of Green’s performance and were eager to strengthen his relationship with the company. In July 2007, Green attended a week-long training session at corporate headquarters. Shannon McDonald, the division vice president, and Mary Jacobs, the national sales director, made a concerted effort to get to know him better. Green and McDonald

1 Harteveldt and Epps, “Self-Service Check-In Clicks with Travelers,” Forrester Report, February 23, 2007

2 Ibid.

2 BRIEFCASES | HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL

Thomas Green: Power, Office Politics, and a Career in Crisis | 2095

were both University of Georgia alumni and Georgia natives. They had an instant connection, and McDonald seemed to take Green under her wing. McDonald had several informal meetings with Green, and by the end of the week Green became aware of an open position for a senior market specialist. Green aggressively campaigned to be considered for this position. Over the next month, Green made several trips to corporate headquarters to meet with McDonald. Green discussed his various client relationships, and McDonald agreed that in a short time he had developed unique insights into their markets. Following a dinner meeting at which Green offered lengthy explanations of the client opportunities he perceived and his strategies for winning them, McDonald promoted him to the position of senior market specialist.

McDonald told Green, “Tom, you are obviously a bright and ambitious account executive. You have a great rapport with your clients. You have made a strong case for your promotion and I’m willing to take a chance on you. I think this group needs a fresh perspective. However, I do have a couple of reservations about your lack of managerial experience. You have only held sales roles, and the senior market specialist position is very different. This new job will require you to think strategically as well as tactically, and you will have to coordinate between several different functions and layers of corporate management. I am hoping you compensate for your lack of experience by seeking out guidance from some of our more seasoned managers.”

Green was assigned to work out of corporate headquarters in Boston. The division’s organizational structure is shown in Exhibit 1. The promotion had been a giant step upward for Green; an account executive interested in joining the marketing team usually moved first to a market specialist position and then put in a number of years in the field before reaching “senior” status. The other senior market specialists in the division were in their forties. Green was 28. His salary was now $125,000, a 50% increase over his previous salary.

Senior market specialists were responsible for identifying industry trends, evaluating new business opportunities, and establishing sales goals. In addition, specialists developed general market and specific client strategies to help the account executives obtain a sale. Green directly supervised the two market specialists in his region. Green reported to Frank Davis, the marketing director. Davis had recently been promoted from the position that Green assumed (see Exhibit 2 for relevant bios).

 

After Green’s Promotion

Green’s promotion became effective on September 10, 2007. McDonald stopped by Green’s office that first day and told Green, “Tom, you are walking into a tricky situation with Frank Davis. Frank had expected to choose the new senior market specialist and it would not have been you. You’ll have to deal with any fallout that might result from that. You are getting an unusual opportunity with this promotion. Don’t let me down.”

Green used most of his first week to review 2006 and 2007 year-to-date sales. He spent the next week with his boss, Frank Davis, making a rapid tour of major airline industry clients. At the end of the week, Davis told Green, “We had some good meetings this week and the clients responded well to your ideas. However, I think we would have been more effective if we had been able to provide the clients with some market data. When you are on your own I expect you to spend a significant amount of time preparing for client meetings and developing supporting detail for your proposals. I know you will need a little time to get up to speed on your new position, but I expect you to start developing some new market strategies for your region soon.”

 

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2095 | Thomas Green: Power, Office Politics, and a Career in Crisis

Green next visited clients, market specialists, and account executives in New York, Atlanta, and Orlando. In addition to the travel, Green’s personal life was very busy. He was searching for a house in Boston, arranging to move belongings there, and still trying to maintain a relationship with his girlfriend in Atlanta.

On October 8, Green attended the 2008 Budget Plan meeting in which Davis presented sales projections for the upcoming year. This was the first time Green had been exposed to the planning and forecasting process. Since Davis had held Green’s position when the estimates were due, the numbers for the Eastern region had been developed without input from Green. At the meeting, Davis assigned 2008 performance commitments for all senior marketing specialists and their teams. Performance reviews would be based upon their ability to meet or exceed the objectives. Green was surprised by the numbers that Davis was proposing. Davis estimated 10% growth in the Eastern region.

According to Green, “Frank Davis was way off base with his pro forma numbers. I had been talking with our account execs and there was no way we could achieve double-digit growth in 2008. The sales goals Frank set for my region were totally unrealistic. In the meeting I expressed my concern that my goals would be impossible to meet. I couldn’t believe I was the only one with the guts to speak up. After the meeting, Frank stopped me in the hall and told me about all these big opportunities for the market. I listened politely, but the time I’d spent out on the road with clients gave me every reason to doubt Frank’s expectations.”

Davis was visibly upset that Green openly challenged him at the meeting. Davis commented to McDonald, “Thomas’s negative attitude is not what we need on this team. Corporate expects this division to be a growth engine for the company. We’ve realized a 10% CAGR over the past 5 years. The market indicators are positive, and with the right sales strategy my projections are attainable. The hotel and car-rental markets are virtually untapped right now. Thomas’s problem is that he’s too conservative in his outlook. He is thinking like an account exec who is only concerned with the sales target. In the senior market specialist position, he has to think outside the box and develop strategies to capture that aggressive growth target.”