Boeing case study Describe the advantages of using a diagnostic model

Case Study

Boeing

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The long list of Boeing’s woes seems to have
reached its pinnacle in late 2003 with the scandal
surrounding the Pentagon deal that alleged inappropriate
behavior and the loss of documents by
Boeing officials. After his seven-year reign at the
head of the organization, December 2003 saw the
eventual resignation of Phil Condit. Many breathed
a sigh of relief at the news. The problems at Boeing
were reportedly endless. From a stock price that
had decreased by 6.5 percent while the company
was under his leadership to increasing competitive
pressures, the future for Boeing was in doubt and
changes were needed.
For many years Boeing graced American corporate
news for their prowess as the leading manufacturer
of aircraft. However, in 1994 Airbus—their main
rival—booked more orders. This shocked the management
executives and began a series of changes
that were implemented to overcome the bureaucratic
structure, outdated technological systems, and
unnecessary processes in a company that had reportedly
changed little since World War II.

THE BEGINNING OF CHANGE AT BOEING
In 1997 market demand increased dramatically and
Boeing attempted to meet this surplus of orders
by doubling their production capabilities instantaneously.
A manufacturing crisis ensued and Boeing’s
reputation took a dramatic turn for the worse when
they were required to halt production of the 747
aircraft for 20 days. The company had “stubbed its
toe,” according to the then-president of the Commercial
Airplane Group, Ron Woodward, who was
dismissed not long after the crisis. The “win at all
costs” approach that Boeing supposedly had to
its business dealings and a lack of communication
within the organization appeared to have been the
source of this problem.
After experiencing these manufacturing difficulties,
an attempt was made to revitalize Boeing’s
operations by streamlining aircraft assembly and
increasing the efficiency of the company. This was to
be done by focusing on production and costs, not on
“airy vision statements.” 43 Their overall strategy was
to update their technology systems, downsize their
operations, and reestablish relationships with their
suppliers—the only feasible way costs could be cut.
Perhaps the first step in recognizing that the
cycle of demand for their products caused massive
fluctuations in revenue each year and the company
needed more stability occurred when Boeing
acquired McDonnell Douglas in 1997 to increase its
defense contracts. This merger, however, brought
with it difficulties in the way of cultural synthesis.
McDonnell Douglas had a very strong culture that
focused on their dealings with government officials
for defense contracts. Combined with Boeing’s
family-orientated culture, the merger was not without
integration issues. The merger also had financial
implications when investors accused the organization
of trickery in regard to the merger with McDonnell
Douglas and a payout of $92.5 million was made to
shareholders.

WHEN TECHNOLOGY BECAME AN ISSUE

In 2001 Boeing adopted the principles of lean
manufacturing and aimed to rejuvenate their reputation
by making their production more efficient.
The object of the project was to implement an automated
system of assembly lines. They also hoped to
coordinate and facilitate easier channels of communication
between Boeing staff and suppliers. They
implemented a Web-based procurement system
that allowed suppliers to monitor stock levels and
replenish supplies when they dipped below a predetermined
minimum.
The process of automating the production line
was a struggle for Boeing. Information technology
within the organization was decentralized and over
400 systems were being used to meet the needs
of various departments. The lack of collaboration
in regard to product procurement meant that the
same product could be manufactured by Boeing for
one aircraft but subcontracted for another. Boeing
had recently chosen to implement a technological
platform to regulate product life cycles. This was
hoped to cut costs and facilitate the more rapid
production of the 7E7. It would do this by standardizing
the “use of specifications, engineering
rules, operational parameters and simulation results
across its extended enterprise.” 44 It was hoped that
this new system would “improve collaboration,
innovation, product quality, time-to-market and
return-on-investment.” 45
154 Chapter 5 Diagnosis for Change

THE CULTURAL IMPLICATIONS
OF DIVERSIFICATION
The decision was made to diversify from the traditional
commercial airline industry and the many
acquisitions that were made created integration
issues for the company. The aim again was to add
more stability to the business by diversifying into
information services and the space industry—
providing services with elevated margins that
would reflect on Boeing’s bottom line. Condit later
admitted that entry into the space industry was an
erroneous move. According to the CEO of Airbus,
Noel Forgeard, the process of diversification was
“extremely demoralizing for Boeing employees,”
but Boeing’s vice president of marketing, Randy
Baseler, claimed that “what affects morale right now
is that we are in a down cycle.” 46 Regardless of the
reasoning behind it, Boeing’s employee morale was
at a low and this issue needed to be addressed.
According to a BusinessWeek reporter, Boeing
was in dire need of “a strong board and a rejuvenated
corporate culture based on innovation and
competitiveness, not crony capitalism.” 47 Boeing’s
past had left its culture in pieces. After the merger
with McDonnell Douglas and many other organizations,
the decision was made in 2001 to move the
headquarters of their operations from their historical
home in Seattle to Chicago. The relocation was
said to be the factor that most significantly disturbed
the culture of Boeing. The move was instigated to
provide a neutral location for the diversified Boeing.
Having acquired many different organizations, the
past connections to the Seattle site were to be severed.
The strategic reason for this move was to help
refocus attention on international growth prospects.

Harry Stonecipher, the past head of McDonnell
Douglas who had come in as the new chief
operating officer of Boeing after the company was
acquired, was announced as the new CEO after
Condit’s resignation. His first important decision
was regarding the new 7E7 planes, which would be
Boeing’s first new plane in a decade. On December
16, 2003, Stonecipher announced that Boeing was
to go ahead with the production of the 7E7 jets.
Stonecipher promised to work closely with unions
to see that the low morale is reversed and that the
planes are produced at a quicker pace and for less
money. Despite Stonecipher’s best efforts, critics are
calling for an outside leader to come in and take
Boeing back to basics.
A researcher of a shareholding firm claimed that
Boeing’s problems lay in the fact that they had
“overpromised and underdelivered.” 48 The past
has shown that Boeing’s inability to react to external
pressures has increased their demise. The future
of the industry will now depend on the ability of
either Airbus or Boeing to predict the way the market
will go. Boeing has bet its future on the market
developing a partiality for smaller aircraft, like
their new 7E7. Airbus, on the other hand, projects
that the airlines will purchase larger aircrafts in the
future.